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ABSTRACT  As the centenary of the Russian revolution of 1917 approaches, it is worth reviewing the 
past 100 years’ discussion amongst economists on the possibility – or otherwise – of economic 
planning under socialism. The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as 
a specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of all economic 
activity. Every economic action whatsoever is premised upon calculation, every choice depends upon 
an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent is to choose. The 
view taken of that choice and its attendant calculation, in market and non-market contexts, is 
constitutive of the schools of thought – Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian alike – which have 
contributed to the debate.  An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required in order to 
understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other.  This paper addresses one particular 
detail of that debate – the claim by Austrian economists that socialism is impossible because the 
absence of private property in the means of production precludes economic calculation. The paper 
suggests that several control rather than private property is required for economic calculation, and 
that several control is consistent with public ownership of the means of production. The Austrian 
argument on this point, therefore, is without force. 
 
                                                          
1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 16th Annual Conference of the Association for Heterodox 
Economics, 2-4 July 2014, University of Greenwich, London, and the 46th
 
UK History of Economic Thought 
Conference, 3-5 September 2014, University of Westminster, London.  I am grateful to attendees, to three 
anonymous referees, and to Richard van den Berg, Guinevere Nell and Per Bylund for their comments.   
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1 Introduction 
 
As the centenary of the Russian Revolution of 1917 approaches, it is worth reviewing the past 
century͛s discussion amongst economists on the possibility – or otherwise – of economic planning 
under socialism.  The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as a 
specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of all economic 
activity.  Every economic action whatsoever is premised upon calculation, every choice depends 
upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent is to 
choose.  The view taken of that choice and its attendant calculation, in market and non-market 
contexts, is constitutive of the schools of thought – Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian alike – which 
have contributed to the debate.  An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required in 
order to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other. 
 
This paper addresses one particular detail of that debate – the claim by Austrian economists that 
socialism is impossible because the absence of private property in the means of production 
precludes economic calculation.  The paper suggests that the Austrian writers make a fundamental 
error when they interpret their own theory to imply that economic calculation depends upon 
private ownership.  Instead of centring their argument on private property they should have 
considered (a) several rather than private property, and (b) control rather than ownership or 
property.  Once one sees that Austrian theory really implies several control, rather than private 
property, the private property argument for the impossibility of socialism evaporates.  This is not to 
say that socialism necessarily therefore is possible, merely that this particular argument for its 
impossibility fails. 
 
The next section looks briefly at what the socialist calculation debate was about, and addresses the 
ŵeaŶiŶg of ͚iŵpossiďilitǇ͛.  Section 3 looks at the Austrian case for claiming that rational economic 
calculation depends upon the existence of private property, finding that key Austrian contributors 
to the debate fail to provide an argument to support this strict interpretation.  Section 4 argues that 
a wider notion of property, namely several property, is a more appropriate notion, and, further, 
that it is control, not property, which is key.  Several control flows naturally from Austrian analysis.  
But several control is not inconsistent with socialism.  Section 5 examines the response of Mises 
and Hayek to the suggestion that an economy can be conceived of based in publicly owned firms 
run by managers under a system of several control.  Section 6 addresses and rejects a potential 
objection to the kind of market socialism that has been described, namely that its socialist content 
has been diluted to the point of disappearing.  A final section sets out the findings of the paper. 
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2 The Socialist Calculation Debate 
 
The socialist calculation debate refers to a controversy amongst academic economists, mainly in 
the inter-war period, as to the possibility of socialist planning. It may be seen as an attempt by 
scholars to address both the coming to power of the communist party in Russia, and the 
apparently inexorable rise of socialist ideas – with planning at their heart – expressed by the 
European social democratic parties, particularly in Germany.  For economists of the Austrian 
school this was not merely an opportunity, but a fundamental duty: defence of the laissez-faire 
system constituted the very raison d'être of economics.  The opening shot was the publication in 
1920 of ͚Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen͛ (Economic calculation in the 
socialist community) by Ludwig von Mises, in Maǆ Weďeƌ͛s German-language journal, Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaften.  In this paper (Mises, 1935) Mises took up and, I may say, comprehensively 
defeated, the calculation-in-kind ideas of the socialist and leading logical positivist, Otto Neurath, 
as well as those of writers such as Nikolai Bukharin, who thought that war communism was the 
first step on a road to a better society. 
 
Mises͛s papeƌ ǁas ƌe-published by Friedrich Hayek in another highlight of the debate, his 1935 
collection, Collectivist Economic Planning. Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism (Hayek, 
1935), which also included essays by Hayek himself, N.G. Pierson, Georg Halm, and Enrico Barone.  
Much ink has been spilt in the interpretative battle between those who believe that Hayek was 
following in Mises͛s footsteps aŶd deǀelopiŶg his ideas, aŶd those ǁho felt oŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ that he 
was abandoning Mises and making undue concessions to the socialists.  An issue in this debate 
concerned the question as to whether Hayek retreated from the position that socialism was 
logically impossible – a stance that Mises seemed to endorse – to merely claiming that it was 
practically impossible.  This question is addressed briefly below.   
 
Another significant contribution to the debate in the 1930s was contained in two articles, which 
were then republished as a book chapter, by Oskar Lange (Lange, 1936; 1937; 1938), setting out 
what has come to be known as the market-socialism model of planning.  The debate and its results 
were notably summarised in ͚Socialist Economics͛ by Abram Bergson (1948).  The socialists were 
widely regarded as having seen off their Austrian antagonists, and few thought that the 
͚iŵpossiďilitǇ thesis͛ retained much credibility.  By 1948, according to Bergson, ͚it seems generally 
agreed that the argument on these questions advanced by Mises himself, at least according to one 
interpretation, is without much force͛ (Bergson, 1966: 193-194).  Lavoie agrees: ͚there is a 
remarkably wide consensus that he [sc Mises] was wrong͛ (Lavoie, 1981: 43).  Since then, several 
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waves of Austrian writers have reverted to the issue to argue that the Austrian contribution to the 
debate was in fact the more profound, and that the impossibility thesis had been proven.  The 
demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries at the beginning of the 
1990s gave impetus to further claims that the Austrians had been right all along.  Particularly worthy 
of mention amongst later Austrian contributions are those of Lavoie (1981), just mentioned, and 
Boettke (2001), which we shall draw on in the sequel. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we will ignore aspects of the debate not relevant to the key point I 
wish to focus on, the question as to whether private property or several control is a prerequisite for 
rational economic calculation.  These aspects include the discussion of planning in kind and the 
application of the labour theory of value to post-capitalist societies.  Ignoring them is not innocuous: 
it embodies a claim, or at least a concession, namely that arguments for rational economic 
calculation can be constructed on neither of these bases. 
 
A preliminary issue which has to be dealt with before the discussion proper concerns what it is that 
the Austrians have done, just assuming for the moment that their argument is valid.  Is it to 
demonstrate an impossibility argument – socialism is, quite simply, impossible, in the same sense 
that it is impossible for a formal system to be both complete and consistent?  Or have they rather 
drawn attention to a practical difficulty of such magnitude that it is wholly unlikely that a workable 
socialism could ever exist.  The former is an absolute, the latter a relative, argument.  Something 
either is or is not impossible, but difficulty is a matter of degree, albeit extreme difficulty might be 
tantamount to impossibility.  This is not a trivial by-issue. If soĐialisŵ is iŵpossiďle theŶ it͛s poiŶtless 
to discuss how it might be implemented.  If it is very difficult then a sober and extensive analysis of 
those difficulties is in order. 
 
Barrow & Tipler (1986: 100, 188) take the view that Hayek had discovered an impossibility principle. 
They cite Hayek to argue that it is impossible to ͚deliberately arrang[e] all the activities that go on in 
a complex society͛ because to do so ͚would no longer make use of many minds, but would be 
altogether dependent on one mind͛ (Hayek, 1973: 49). That ͚oŶe ŵiŶd͛ ǁould faĐe the 
insurmountable problem that ͚a sufficiently accurate model͛ of the society ͚would be too complex to 
be coded in any mind or computer in the society͛ (Barrow & Tipler, 1986: 188-189).  Indeed, ͚one of 
HaǇek͛s aƌguŵeŶts ǁas aĐtuallǇ a foƌŵal ŵatheŵatiĐal pƌoof that a fiŶite state ŵaĐhiŶe Đould Ŷot 
predict its future evolution͛ because of ͚the impossibility of complete self-reference͛ (Barrow & 
Tipler, 1986: 189).  Barrow & Tipler (1986: 215, n276) suggest that Hayek in this way anticipated 
Turing since, although The Sensory Order (Hayek, 1952), which is said to contain this argument, was 
published in the 1950s, it was actually drafted in the 1920s.  No further explanation is given as to 
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how anything in The Sensory Order constitutes the anticipation of Turing that Barrow and Tipler 
claim, and inspection of the volume itself did not reveal anything bearing on this matter to this 
writer. 
 
Mises seems clear on the matter, asserting in numerous places and without caveat that ͚rational 
economic activity is impossible in a socialist commonwealth͛ (Mises, 1935: 130).   Hayek himself 
took the second position, that socialist planning was not in principle impossible, but so very 
difficult that it is wholly improbable that humans could ever devise such a system.  Discussing the 
mathematical solution to economic calculation under socialism of Taylor, Roper and Dickinson, 
Hayek says that ͚it must be admitted that this is not an impossibility in the sense that it is logically 
contradictory͛, rather ͚It is only necessary to attempt to visualize what the application of this 
method would imply in practice in order to rule it out as humanly impracticable and impossible͛ 
(Hayek, 1935: 207-208).  Moreover this second, less extreme version, is the meaning of 
͚iŵpossiďilitǇ͛ ǁhiĐh he asĐƌiďes to Mises.  Mises, he saǇs, 
 
emphasized in particular … that the wastes due to the impossibility of rational calculation in 
a completely socialized system might be serious enough to make it impossible to maintain 
alive the present populations of the more densely inhabited countries.  (Hayek, 1935: 34) 
 
This is clearly a matter of degree.  The system can be imagined, and such a system might or might 
Ŷot, pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷot iŶ HaǇek͛s aŶd Mises͛s ǀieǁ, fiŶd it possiďle to sustaiŶ its eǆistiŶg huŵaŶ 
population.  Despite Mises͛s ŵoƌe eǆtƌeŵe stateŵeŶts this appears to be the most sensible reading 
of his contribution.  We will therefore exclusively address the impossibility argument in this sense. 
 
3 The Austrian case: private property as precondition for economic calculation 
 
So we turn to the Austrian case for the essential rôle of private property for economic calculation. 
Boettke sets out this centrality very clearly: 
 
IŶ Mises͛ ǁƌitiŶgs theƌe aƌe fouƌ ďasiĐ ǁaƌŶiŶgs agaiŶst soĐialisŵ – the most decisive, of 
course, was the problem of the impossibility of rational economic calculation … IŶ a 
fundamental sense, all of these arguments are derivative of an argument for private 
property. Without private property, there can be no advanced economic process. (Boettke, 
2001: 33) 
 
Mises͛s argument about private property, according to Boettke, is impounded within the following 
sequence of propositions: 
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1 Without private property in the means of production, there will be no market for the 
means of production. 
2 Without a market for a means of production, there will be no monetary prices 
established for the means of production. 
3 Without monetary prices, reflecting the relative scarcity of capital goods, economic 
decision-makers will be unable to rationally calculate the alternative use of capital 
goods. (Boettke, 2001: 31) 
 
We can certainly agree with Boettke that we cannot have economic calculation without monetary 
prices, which communicate to agents the relative scarcity of capital goods.  We can also agree that 
without markets it will be difficult to establish reliable monetary prices, though there is more to be 
said on that which we cannot follow up here.  But is it the case that without private property in the 
means of production there can be no markets for those capital goods?  Let͛s tƌǇ to suŵŵaƌise the 
argument. 
 
When an individual makes a transaction they receive information impounded in the price they face, 
and they transmit information which is used in updating the price.  The potential purchaser 
compares the utility he believes he will obtain from consuming the good with the utility he might 
gain in the next best alternative use of the fraction of his wealth represented by the price.  We may 
infer that, if the individual behaves rationally, he will purchase additional units of the good until the 
marginal  benefits he obtains equals the marginal opportunity cost to himself of doing so, and then 
stop.  The price has acted as a medium in which is expressed the value to the consumer of the utility 
that he might gain from consuming this or other alternative goods.  It allows comparability between 
qualitatively incommensurable use-values.  But it has done more than this.  The purchaser has 
communicated to the market the value to himself of the marginal unit of the good, in terms of the 
opportunity cost he is prepared to incur in order to obtain it, denominated in money units.  The  
same story applies on the supply side.  Calculation, that is, the comparison of the estimated cost and 
the forecast benefit of marginal units, ensures that each agent gains an optimal bundle of goods,   
and that an optimal bundle of goods is produced for society as a whole.  The story is a familiar one to 
economists.  Without the discipline of monetary prices, we would have no guide to the appropriate 
allocations of effort and resources.  The Austrian standpoint is not to say that this optimal position is 
normally or even ever attained, but that the existence of prices underpins a continual error 
correction mechanism, such that agents are learning from their past experiences where they should 
expand and contract activities, continually adjusting prices and quantities in the direction of 
increasing efficiency. 
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What has been said so far applies to any economic agent, but a special place is accorded to the 
entrepreneur in the Austrian vision.  The entrepreneur carries out the functions mentioned above, 
but in relation, Ŷot to ͚fiƌst oƌdeƌ͛ oƌ ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ goods, ďut to those of a ͚higheƌ oƌdeƌ͛ oƌ 
production goods, capital goods.  This has a number of consequences. In estimating the benefits of 
an investment, the entrepreneur compares, not the satisfactions expected from the consumption of 
this and the next best alternative good, but the profit available from producing this and the next  
best alternative good.  So he is considering not his own satisfactions, but the satisfactions he 
expects others to obtain from the consumption of the good which his investment will make 
possible.  The ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s puƌĐhases aƌe speĐulatiǀe, siŶĐe he does Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat utilitǇ he ǁill 
deƌiǀe uŶtil he ĐoŶsuŵes it, ǁheŶ it͛s too late to ĐhaŶge his ŵiŶd.  The eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ͛s deĐisioŶs aƌe 
doubly speculative since he is speculating on what the consumer will speculate on.  To appraise the 
benefits of the investment he has to impute or ascribe benefits to the future, hoped-for consumers.  
The lure of profits and the threat of losses thus drives entrepreneurs to exert themselves to invest 
in capital goods that will best serve the consumers at the point where the new goods, produced 
with the aid of these capital goods, come onto the market.  The accumulation of losses will drive out 
of the market those who are relatively weak at this, and accumulated profits will reward and 
encourage those who are good at it.  The market for capital goods is thus of critical importance as it 
allows the level and composition of investment to approach what consumers want, given their rate 
of time preference and the difficulty of producing output. 
 
The previous two paragraphs represent my understanding of the Austrian position on the nature of 
calculation, a position which I share.  The account places markets at its core, and for markets to 
function there must most certainly be property.  But does this mean that that property must 
necessarily be private?  This is constitutes a jump, and moreover an unwarranted one.  Starting 
from a profound understanding of the need for markets and consequently for property, Austrians 
make the unexamined interpretative leap to the assertion that that property must be private.  They 
go on to state that under socialism, since there will be no private property in the means of 
production, there will be no capital market, and hence no monetary prices for capital goods.  The 
title of Boettke͛s ďook, Calculation and Coordination, 
 
is also meant to convey the connection between these two key concepts – advanced 
complex coordination requires that economic actors are able to utilize the tools of 
economic calculation provided by private property, market prices and profit and loss 
accounting. (Boettke, 2001: 4) 
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Acting people must mentally process the alternatives placed before them, and to do so they 
ŵust haǀe soŵe ͞aid to the huŵaŶ ŵiŶd͟ foƌ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg iŶputs aŶd output. Mises͛ gƌeat 
contribution to economic science was to establish that this decision-making ability is 
dependent on the institutional context of private property … In short, without private 
property in the means of production, rational economic calculation is not possible.  (Boettke, 
2001: 31) 
 
The key issue for Hayek, as it was for Mises, is that absent private property in the means of 
production rational economic calculation will be impossible.  (Boettke, 2001: 36) 
 
There is a footnote to Boettke͛s reference to Mises (Boettke, 2001: 289 n4), but it seems to refer us 
only to an assertion by Mises that this is the case, not an argument.  Another footnote (290 n6) 
refers us to Mises (1922: 99) for three advantages of private property.  I was unable to find any 
account of the alleged three-fold advantages of private property on p 99 or elsewhere in this work.  
I haǀe seaƌĐhed thƌough Mises͛s ǁoƌks ͚Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth͛ and 
Socialism. An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Mises, 1935; 1951) without finding an argument 
for the critical rôle of private property in the overall case against socialism. 
 
Boettke sets out his own understanding of the case as follows: 
 
The most important component of their [sĐ Mises͛s aŶd HaǇek͛s] argument was the 
functional significance they placed on the institution of private property and the rule of law. 
Property rights protected by the rule of law provide: 
1 legal certainty, which encourages investment; 
2 a motivation for responsible decision-making on behalf of owners; 
3 the background for social experimentation, which spurs progress; and 
4 the basis for economic calculation by expanding the context within which price, and 
profit and loss, signals can reasonably guide resource use.  (Boettke, 2001: 197-198) 
 
Firstly, we may note that this is entirely about private property – private property is by definition a 
property right protected by the rule of law.  So how do the properties of private property, according 
to Boettke, constitute the essential underpinning for economic calculation?  Point 1: it is of course 
true that legal certainty is required for calculation and investment.  So property rights are essential.  
But must those rights constitute private property?  There is nothing here to say that public property 
will not do the job.  Point 2: again, it is certainly the case that rational economic calculation requires 
responsible decision-making both on the part of, and on behalf of, owners.  But where is the 
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argument that public property will lead to irresponsible decision-making on the part of or on behalf 
of the population?  We entrust the latter to choose their government, after all, and, for all its faults, 
democracy remains ͚the worst form of government, except for all the others͛.  Point 3: again, if the 
assertion is that public property cannot provide a background for experimentation, then the case 
needs to be made.  Point 4: the implicit claim seems to be that public property is incapable of 
providing a context for signals to guide resource use.  But that is to say that economic calculation is 
impossible without private pƌopeƌtǇ, ǁhiĐh is to ďeg the ƋuestioŶ: that͛s ǁhat ǁe aƌe tƌǇiŶg to 
establish. 
 
4 Private versus several property, and ownership versus control 
 
Having looked for an argument for the necessity of private property for economic calculation in 
these core documents of the socialist calculation debate, and failed to find one, we turn to an 
alternative, and indeed one endorsed by Hayek: several property, oƌ ͚separate ownership͛.  
Discussion of this point by correspondents and referees has shown some confusion on this point so 
I will take pains to spell this out more clearly than was the case in previous versions.    
 
4.1 Private Property and several property 
 
HaǇek͛s last book, The Fatal Conceit, systematically uses the term several property instead of 
private property: 
 
an order serving a multiplicity of private purposes could in fact have been formed only on 
the basis of what I prefer to call several property, which is H. S. Maine's more precise term 
for what is usually described as private property. (Hayek, 1988: 29-30) 
 
decentralised control over resources, control through several property, leads to the 
generation and use of more information than is possible under central direction.  (Hayek, 
1988: 86) 
 
[W]e have tried to disentangle some of the confusions caused by the ambiguity of terms … 
and as the reader will have noticed, I generally prefer the less usual but more precise term 
`several property' to the more common expression `private property'.  (Hayek, 1988: 110) 
 
Hayek is tantalising here: despite using the term several on dozens of occasions, and indeed pointing 
out that that is what he is doing, he says nothing about why the term is preferable, or how it can be 
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ĐoŶsideƌed ͚ŵoƌe pƌeĐise͛.  HaǇek ƌefeƌs us to H.“. MaiŶe͛s Lectures on the Early History of 
Institutions (Maine, 1875).  Several property is not a major theme of that book, and Maine only uses 
the term on a very small number of occasions.  Where he does so, it is clear that he uses it as a 
sǇŶoŶǇŵ foƌ ͚pƌopeƌtǇ iŶ seǀeƌaltǇ͛.  In his discussion of the evolution of several property, or 
property in severalty, from common tribal lands in Ireland, he indicates that several property is the 
result of ͞the seǀeƌaŶĐe of laŶd fƌoŵ the ĐoŵŵoŶ teƌƌitoƌǇ͟, aŶd that this is ͞ŵost Đoŵplete iŶ the 
case of the Chiefs, many of whom have large private estates͟ ;MaiŶe, 1ϴϳ5: ϵ5Ϳ.  Maine is thus using 
the term in its common legal meaning.  In law several means applying to individual parties 
independently: someone under a several liability may be pursued independently for satisfaction of 
the liability, regardless of whether anyone else is also liable; a party holding a property in severalty 
owns that property independently of any other party, as opposed to common or joint ownership.  
The party holding a property in severalty need not be a single biological person – they could well be a 
legal person such as a corporation.   
 
“o hoǁ does HaǇek͛s aŶd MaiŶe͛s Đoncept of several property differ from private property?  Barnett 
(2014) is very clear:   
 
several property – a term favoured by Friedrich Hayek – may be more apt [than private 
property]. The term ͞several property͟ makes it clearer that jurisdiction to use resources is 
dispersed among the ͞several͟ – meaning ͞diverse, many, numerous, distinct, particular, or 
sepaƌate͟ peƌsoŶs aŶd assoĐiatioŶs that Đoŵprise a society. (Barnett, 2014: 65, quoting the 
Oxford English Dictionary.) 
 
The right of several property suggests that the control of resources should reflect the 
dispersal of personal and local knowledge. (Barnett, 2014: 68) 
 
So, essentially, several property is divided property with a single legal owner, property which is no 
longer held in common or jointly, with plural owners, as tribal property was, but has been severed.  
(The conversion from one to the other is still today called severance.)  Several property is thus 
opposed to the common property of a community – but, and this key – there is no particular 
requirement for it to be private, or non-governmental divided property, rather than public divided 
property.   
 
This may sound paradoxical, so permit me to illustrate.  Enclosure is the process by which vast 
swathes of common land have been severed in modern times to become several property which is 
also private property.  Common land is held in common by the community.  Enclosed land is private 
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property held in severalty.  Nationalisation and subsequent privatisation is a process in the post-war 
period whereby many UK private-sector companies have been taken into the public sector and then 
sold back into private ownership.  The Steel Company of Wales was a private sector steel producer 
owned by its shareholders.  Those shareholders had private property in their shares, and this is 
indeed an instance of several property, since they can each dispose of their shares without 
requiring permission from anyone else.  As it happens, the company was nationalised and privatised 
several times.  Upon nationalisation, and wholly owned by the British Steel Corporation (BSC), it 
constituted several but not private property.  This is still an instance of several ownership as the 
property is owned by a single legal person, namely BSC, which can do whatever it wants to with its 
equity in the company.  If it were not several property then, by definition, it would be common 
property, which would imply that anyone could walk into the Margam works in Port Talbot and do 
whatever they wanted to with the machinery, the raw materials, and the finished products they 
found there.  It would however be perverse to describe this as private property, and it would be 
inconsistent with the usage of Austrian economists, since the company was now owned by the state 
on behalf of the populace.     
 
So unlike private property, several property does not preclude public ownership.  And this is the 
point.  For if we can have such a thing as several property which is also in some sense public or 
social property, then all the Austrian arguments about the practicality of economic calculation can 
be sustained without the necessity for private property, and the private property argument for the 
impossibility of socialism fails. 
 
4.2 Several property and several control 
 
The question is thus, can we envisage a form of several property which is not private property but 
which is consistent with Austrian insistence on the requirement of a dynamic, rivalrous market 
process?  To help us here we need to draw on a second major distinction, that between property or 
ownership, on the one hand, and control, on the other.  Hayek and Barnett indeed point in this 
direction:  Hayek ƌefeƌs to the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ ͞deĐeŶtƌalised ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ ƌesouƌĐes, ĐoŶtƌol 
thƌough seǀeƌal pƌopeƌtǇ͟, ǁhile BaƌŶet points out that several property suggests dispersed control.  
Who actually makes the decisions on behalf of the large corporations, government departments, 
and non-profit institutions characteristic of capitalistic economies today?  It is the directors, 
managers and administrators of those bodies, and not the owners, whether they be shareholders or 
voters or some other group.  Boettke, too, alludes to this separation of ownership and control when 
he claims that 
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In economics, ownership rights refer to the locus of effective decision-making about the use 
of resources (i.e. de facto ownership), and may or may not be consistent with legal 
boundaries of property (de jure ownership). This insight is today a standard convention 
among economists. (Boettke, 2001: 177) 
 
But this is not quite right.  Boettke seems to believe that economics is exclusively concerned with 
legal ownership – ͞the loĐus of effective decision-ŵakiŶg … ;i.e. de facto oǁŶeƌshipͿ͟.  But ďeŶefiĐial 
ownership – ͞legal ďouŶdaƌies of pƌopeƌtǇ ;de jure oǁŶeƌshipͿ͟ – cannot be ignored.  To avoid 
confusion it will be worth spelling out legal and beneficial ownership by means of an example.  I am 
ŵǇ ŵotheƌ͛s attoƌŶeǇ.  This ŵeaŶs that I ĐaŶ dƌaǁ doǁŶ heƌ fuŶds aŶd ŵake puƌĐhases aŶd eŶteƌ 
into legally enforceable contracts: I am the legal owner of those funds.  But the person to whose 
benefit the results of those transactions must be applied is my mother: she is the beneficial owner 
(or equitable owner).  Similarly, the management of a joint-stock company is the legal owner, and 
the shareholders constitute the beneficial owners (or equitable owners: they own equity in the firm).   
 
The principal-agent problem says that an agent – the manager, the legal owner – may be tempted to 
distort those decisions which he is called on to make on behalf of a principal – the shareholder, the 
beneficial or equitable owner – by considering his own interests instead of those of the principal.  
This is a matter of degree.  We can imagine instances when the weight placed by the agent on his 
own interest is zero, and those at the other extreme where it approaches unity, completely excluding 
the interest of the principal.  And in the general case the severity of the principal-agent problem has 
an intermediate value.  Keynes gives an example of the process running to a point where the 
pƌiŶĐipal͛s iŶteƌest is haƌdlǇ ĐoŶsideƌed at all; speakiŶg of the BaŶk of England, prior to its 
nationalisation, he says  
 
there is no class of persons in the kingdom of whom the Governor of the Bank of England 
thinks less when he decides on his policy than of his shareholders.  Their rights, in excess of 
their conventional dividend have already sunk to the neighbourhood of zero.  (Keynes, 
1972: 290). 
 
In a system with a separation between ownership and control, the managers make the decisions and 
there is a principal-agent problem: those decisions are to some extent sub-optimal for the owners, 
giǀiŶg uŶdue ǁeight to the ŵaŶageƌs͛ iŶteƌests.  If, as KeǇŶes aŶd Boettke appeaƌ to ďelieǀe, this is a 
pƌoĐess ǁhiĐh iŶeǀitaďlǇ leads to the eǆpƌopƌiatioŶ of the ďeŶefiĐial oǁŶeƌs, the ͚de jure oǁŶeƌs͛, 
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then it only remains to re-write the property rights to match the new reality: the servant has become 
the master.  But this describes the consequence of a principal-agent problem so severe that 
ultimately the agent becomes the new principal.  It cannot be the general case.  Strangely, for an 
Austrian writer, Boettke conflates an end state with the process which might under certain 
circumstances lead to it.  He is not alone.  Lavoie (1981: 42) ascribes putative misunderstanding of 
the socialist calculation debate by ͚neoclassical historians of economic thought͛ to their failure to 
realise that ͚ownership͛ really means ͚de facto control, over resources͛. 
 
Nevertheless, and despite these deficiencies of expression, it is clear that Austrian writers recognise 
that the key point is not property rights per se, or beneficial ownership, but de facto control over 
resources, that is, legal ownership.  And the Austrian requirement is that that control be several with 
the control of resources reflecting the dispersal of personal and local knowledge.   
 
This section has introduced the idea of several control, and argued  
(a) that all the Austrian arguments regarding the necessity for private property to underpin 
economic calculation go through with several property, the term which Hayek and Barnett 
preferred; and  
(b) that the standard Austrian approach to property, focusing not on property per se, but on control 
– ͞the locus of effective decision-making about the use of resources (i.e. de facto ownership)͟ – 
leads us naturally to a notion of several control.   
 
But several control is consistent with public ownership.  What would this look like?  Well, if nothing 
else changed, it would look exactly like present-day capitalism, except that the means of production 
would be collectively owned.  Just as today, under several control with private property, the 
managers run joint-stock firms on behalf of the stock-holders, under several control with public 
ownership the managers would run such firms on behalf of the society as a whole.  Everything 
which today is organised by markets would be organised by markets under such a scheme.  While it 
is tempting to go into greater detail, it is important not to.  The argument is a general argument and 
that generality is to be preserved: experience suggests that with greater detail, discussants get 
distracted into arguing about the detail instead of the principles involved.  Finally it should be noted 
that nothing here is advocacy: not only is this not the place for it, but if I were to advocate anything, 
it would not be this.   
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5 Hayek and Mises on several control 
 
Let͛s see hoǁ Mises aŶd HaǇek addƌess this issue.  It quickly becomes clear that, although the 
expression several control was unknown to them, both were perfectly aware of the challenge it 
posed to their anti-socialist standpoint.  Mises͛s disĐussioŶ, iŶ Socialism. An Economic and 
Sociological Analysis, occurs in the context of a discussion of ͚artificial͛ markets as a solution to the 
problem of economic calculation: 
 
The advocates of the artificial market, however, are of the opinion that an artificial market 
can be created by instructing the controllers of the different industrial units to act as if 
they were entrepreneurs in a capitalistic state. They argue that even under Capitalism the 
managers of joint stock companies work not for themselves but for the companies, that is 
to say, for the shareholders. Under Socialism, therefore, it would be possible for them to 
act in exactly the same way as before, with the same circumspection and devotion to duty. 
(Mises, 1922: 138). 
 
It is prejudicial for Mises to refer to the markets, within which the controllers of the collectively-
oǁŶed fiƌŵs iŶteƌaĐt, as ͞aƌtifiĐial͟ aŶd as ͞ďeiŶg Đƌeated͟ in this way: it is a rhetorical trope designed 
to suggest to the reader, before the argument, that such markets are in some sense deficient.  If 
Cadbury is bought by Kraft we do not say that the market for chocolate has become artificial; neither 
should we say that the market for steel has become artificial when the (private) Steel Company of 
Wales is acquired by the (public) British Steel Corporation.  Nevertheless, Mises has indeed identified 
the key issue here – whether controllers of corporations can fulfil their duties under public ownership 
as they can under private ownership.  HaǇek agƌees ǁith Mises͛s pƌeseŶtatioŶ of the ƋuestioŶ: 
 
The question, then, is not whether all problems of production and distribution can be 
rationally decided by one central authority but whether decisions and responsibility can be 
successfully left to competing individuals who are not owners … [of] the means of 
production under their charge.  (Hayek, 1935: 219-220) 
 
So what answer do they give to this question?  Mises͛s aŶsǁeƌ seems to start with an argument that 
there is a difference between state-appointed and stock-holder appointed managers (Mises, 1922: 
138).  The shareholders are risking their own property.  This will sometimes work and be profitable, 
and sometimes not.  The line of thought seems to be that the market will select for enrichment  
those shareholders who make good choices and vice versa for the rest.  But ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, ďeĐause 
the argument loses focus and diverts into to a discussion of static and dynamic conceptions (Mises, 
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1922: 139).  The connection of this with the topic supposedly under discussion remains obscure: 
presumably it is preparatory for the next topic, about the necessity of a capital market to ensure a 
rational allocation of resources to the production of capital goods.  However, we are left in the dark 
as to the essential difference that the hiring problem introduces between public and private 
enterprises. 
 
Mises͛s discussion of static and dynamic approaches leads into a rather fragmentary discussion of 
capital markets.  This revolves around a notion of ͚speculative capitalists͛ – those who decide 
whether capital should be withdrawn from one sphere of production and transferred to another. 
͚This is not a matter for the managers of joint stock companies,͛ Mises claims, ͚it is essentially a 
matter for the capitalists … who buy and sell stocks and shares, who make loans and recover them, 
who make deposits in the banks and draw them out of the banks again, who speculate in all kinds 
of commodities͛ (Mises, 1922: 139).  Now, despite Mises͛s Đlaiŵ, these fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe geŶeƌallǇ 
carried out by the staff of banks and large financial corporations.  So, again, the question is, 
whether they can be employed by state institutions as they are now by private-sector ones.  Again, 
the argument that this cannot work is inconclusive and seems to lose its way. 
 
Mises justifies his assumption that capital markets cannot be run on a socialist basis thus: 
 
It is scarcely to be assumed that socialists of whatever persuasion would seriously propose 
that this functioŶ should ďe ŵade oǀeƌ to soŵe gƌoup of people ǁho ǁould ͚siŵplǇ͛ haǀe 
the business of doing what capitalists and speculators do under capitalistic conditions, the 
only difference being that the product of their foresight should not belong to them but to 
the community. Proposals of this sort may well be made concerning the managers of joint 
stock companies. They can never be extended to capitalists and speculators, for no socialist 
would dispute that the function which capitalists and speculators perform under Capitalism, 
namely directing the use of capital goods into that direction in which they best serve the 
demands of the consumer, is only performed because they are under the incentive to 
preserve their property and to make profits which increase it or at least allow them to live 
without diminishing their capital. (Mises, 1922: 141) 
 
A number of comments are in order here.  FiƌstlǇ, it is Ŷot foƌ Mises to deĐide oŶ soĐialists͛ ďehalf 
what the latter ŵaǇ oƌ ŵaǇ Ŷot ͚seƌiouslǇ pƌopose͛ or dispute.  Either these activities are indeed 
functions, and then indeed they have to be fulfilled under socialism as much as under capitalism, or 
they are not, and they can be allowed to wither away.   The second point is that, of course, the 
owners of the capital in question, the population as a whole, acting through their democratic 
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political processes, will face exactly the incentive that Mises mentions, to preserve and augment 
their property, and to balance that goal with living well.  And so they will have every incentive to 
select and invigilate entrepreneurial administrators who will serve these interests – just as the 
owners of capital do today.  The question is, whether there is an agent-principal problem which is so 
different – in magnitude or qualitatively different – from that facing the owners of capital under 
capitalism, that this kind of market socialism simply becomes impossible.   
 
The conclusion to ďe dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ a ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of Mises͛s disĐussioŶ of this point, therefore, is  
that although, of course, one can think of very serious principal-agent problems which socialist 
firms and socialist banks would face in employing and managing its managers and administrators, 
Mises has not made any case that these principal-agent problems would be worse than those faced 
by capitalist firms and banks, let alone so much worse as to render socialism impossible. 
 
Turning to Hayek, again, tantalisingly, he slips away from the topic under discussion to talk about 
something else – in this case the appropriate treatment of monopolies (Hayek, 1935: 220).  Though 
the management of monopolies is indeed an important question both for capitalist and socialist 
economics, what this has to do with the topic – namely the possibility of a socialist system hiring 
managers for the various industrial, financial and commercial undertakings to carry out rational 
economic calculation – is undisclosed. 
 
Eventually Hayek does return to the question: ͚At first sight͛, he concedes, ͚it is not evident why 
such a socialist system with competition within industries as well as between them should not work 
as well or as badly as competitive capitalism͛ (Hayek, 1935: 232).  ͚The crucial questions in this case 
are, What is to be the independent business unit? Who is to be the manager? What resources are to 
be entrusted to him and how his [sic] success or failure is to be tested?͛ 
 
It is not possible to conceive of th[e] central authority simply as a kind of super-bank which 
lends the available funds to the highest bidder. It would lend to persons who have no 
property of their own. It would therefore bear all the risk and would have not claim for a 
definite amount of money as a bank has. (Hayek, 1935: 232-233) 
 
But this is completely wrong.  A publicly-owned bank is not lending to the managers of a firm in 
their personal capacity but in their capacity as representatives of the firm: the contract is with the 
firm. There must be an expectation of future revenues and a calculation of risk-weighted 
expectations of profit and loss, and a legal claim on the assets of that firm, if lending is not to 
become simply gift. 
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Hayek next makes the very valid point that with the passage of time, there will be changes in 
circumstances requiring changes in economic organisation. ͚On what principles will it [sc central 
authority] act?͛ (Hayek, 1935: 233). 
 
The decision to whom to entrust a given amount of resources will have to be made on the 
basis of individual promises of future return. Or, rather, it will have to be made on the 
statement that a certain return is to be expected with a certain degree of probability. There 
will, of course, be no objective test of the magnitude of the risk. But who is to decide 
whether the risk is worth taking? The central authority will have no other grounds on which 
to decide but the past performance of the entrepreneur.  (Hayek, 1935: 234). 
 
Here Hayek has clearly forgotten what he was supposed to be talking about, namely the 
͚competitive solution͛ to the calculation problem, that is, the situation where socially owned means 
of production are run as several property by managers employed as agents of the public sector.  In 
this conception of socialism, it is the managers of the bank and the managers of the firm, acting as 
representatives of their businesses, who will make these decisions on the basis of price signals, and 
thereby contribute to the continual renewal of those prices and their adaptation to new 
circumstances.  The decisions that Hayek mentions will be made on the basis of prices.  Hayek now 
passes on to various questions, all of which flow from this mischaracterisation of the case he is 
supposed to be examining and we cannot follow him into their intricacies. 
 
So, again, we find that in the key documents of the socialist calculation debate there is no Austrian 
argument for the essential rôle of private property, rather than several control, in economic 
calculation, and hence for the impossibility of socialism.  It is of course the case that alternative 
arguments have been sought and proposed.  One is the information argument, introduced by 
Hayek, and summarised thus by Boettke: 
 
The importance of this emphasis on private property should not be underestimated. 
Without private property the very exchange process which generates the informational 
inputs into the decision process would not be produced. All the data that are given in many 
of the models that we will discuss shortly would not exist. In other words, it is not that in the 
absence of private property in the means of production it is more difficult to access 
economic knowledge; rather, the knowledge is not available to anyone (centralized, 
decentralized, or computer planners) because it will not come into existence.  (Boettke, 
2001: 290 n8) 
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The problem, again, is that this begs the question.  It is assumed that ͚Without private property the 
… exchange process … would not be produced͛.  Well, why not?  Why would the exchange process 
between the severally-controlled but publicly-owned socialist enterprises not generate and 
communicate the information, the data, that agents require in order to carry out economic 
calculation?  Much has been written by Hayek and his followers on the question of the rôle of 
information in economics, much of it extremely rich and enlightening.  But what it does not do is to 
answer the question as to the necessity of private property for a functioning economy. 
 
6 Is there anything left? 
 
At this point I think it is necessary to anticipate and address an Austrian objection, which will surely 
be raised, to what I have said.  Namely, the system described so emulates the capitalist system that 
there is nothing left of socialism in it.  Marx famously called the joint-stock company ͚the abolition  
of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production͛ (Marx, 1959: 438).  It 
might be claimed that the consistent market socialism outlined above constitutes the abolition of  
the socialist mode of production within the socialist mode of production.  That would be false.  It is 
important to underline that what I say here is not to be understood as advocacy.  I am not 
advocating here a socialism such as I describe, but addressing the focus of this paper – the question 
as to whether socialism of any kind is possible.  So the contention is, that indeed it is possible, for 
the state to own all the means of production, and the managers to be charged with operating 
individual enterprises on a profit-maximising basis, under the guidance of prices emerging from the 
market process, and for rational economic calculation to take place. 
 
It might be thought that in the system of public property with several control, the rôle of 
government would be to plan, that is, to decide what are the correct prices.  All the problems of 
capitalism can be reduced to the proposition that where individual agents are behaving in a 
manner which is sub-optimal from the perspective of society, this will be not because they are 
nasty or stupid, but because they are receiving incorrect signals and facing the wrong incentives, in 
the form of spontaneously emerging market prices.  Does anyone today believe that the prices we 
face are right, that is, are what we require in order to align individual and social interests?  The 
problem is that nobody in a capitalist system has the task of adjusting the constellation of prices 
that we face, only that of implementing their own interest, taking that constellation as given: the 
prices which emerge are an unintended consequence of that self-seeking activity, and there is no 
reason to believe that unintended consequences are necessarily benign.  Prices and the price 
system are external effects, that is, effects imposed on all and not themselves mediated by prices: 
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nobody has bought or sold the prices at which we must trade; we cannot choose to select the 
prices we want by casting our dollar votes.  Under a socialist system the selection of appropriate 
prices would presumably be a core public function. 
 
It is possible, then, that the desired prices in every market would be achieved by the general 
imposition of a system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies.  What are the big issues?  Damage to the 
environment?  Tax those activities that damage the environment to the extent of our best guess as 
to the present value of the damage done.  Poverty?  Deliver the poor a subsidy in the form of a 
basic income which does not damage the incentive to work.  Inequality?  Impose a steeply 
progressive income tax.  And so on.  Since the means of production are public property, all profits 
will flow into the public domain, either as dividend payments to the sole shareholder, or through 
capital gains deriving from the reinvestment of undistributed profits, and via tax revenue, as today, 
so financing such schemes should be possible.   
 
To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth pointing out measures which I have not mentioned.  I have 
not mentioned the possibility of price-setting on the part of the state: the imposition of price floors 
and ceilings, or the dictation of prices to market participants, would be instances of central control 
and would violate the several control outlined above.  What about state determination of 
investment?  I repeat what was said earlier: every function today carried out by the market would 
be carried out by the market under a system of public property with several control.  Of course, the 
government would be free to manipulate the costs and benefits to firms of further investment via 
appropriate Pigovian taxes and subsidies.  But that is not the same as dictating to firms via non-
price interventions.   
 
So far as I can see there simply is no Austrian argument for the impossibility of such a system.  
Spontaneous prices aggregate all the continually changing information of time and place accessible 
to the market participants, and the central adjustment to those prices aggregates that information 
which is not accessible to the market participants as such, but accessible to the polity via the 
democratic process.  It might occur to you that what has been described would be difficult in the 
extreme to implement.  Of course.  Such a system would, I imagine, be characterised by bickering 
and snafus on a massive scale.  Just as capitalism is.  But that is not the same as saying that it is 
impossible.  Socialism, just supposing it were ever tried, may indeed turn out to be the worst 
possiďle ŵode of pƌoduĐtioŶ … eǆĐept foƌ all the otheƌs. 
 
This, I think, dispels the potential counter-argument that the system of public ownership of the 
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means of production, coupled with the individual enterprise of a profession of managers and 
administrators, would necessarily lack any socialist content.  To repeat: nothing here is advocacy, 
merely exploration of possibilities, in order to put the Austrian claim of impossibility to the test.  
Readers will be tempted to think of a million and one objections to what I have said, and no doubt 
many of those objections will have much force.  But those readers should focus on the key point 
addressed here: is a capitalist system based on private property essential for rational economic 
calculation, or is such calculation at least possible in a socialist system based on collective 
ownership and several control? 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
This paper has looked at a small sample of the literature on the socialist calculation debate and even 
there has focused exclusively on one question: the Austrian case for claiming that private property 
is a prerequisite for rational economic calculation, and that socialism is therefore impossible. The 
paper has drawn the conclusion that the Austrians would have interpreted their own theory 
correctly, if they had said instead that rational economic calculation depended on several control.  
Not private but several, and not property but control.  However, several control, it was argued, is 
compatible with socialism.  Hence the private-property argument for the impossibility of socialism 
fails.  This is not to say that socialism is possible and it is not to say that socialism is desirable.  It is to 
say that one specific argument that socialism is impossible is without force.   
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